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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
but that same amount did not constitute a gift. The Court took notice
of the problem of integration but indicated that it was contrary to the
intention of Congress. In Prouty v. Commissioner" it was said, "The
gift tax does not need to be so closely integrated with the income tax
that decisions like the Clifford case extending the application of sec-
tion 22(a) to the grantor of a trust must necessarily be read as hold-
ing that no gift tax was payable upon the creation of the trust." This
case upon which the Court in the instant case placed great reliance has
no bearing on the problem whether the trust earnings arising annuall3
constitute a taxable gift from the grantor. There is no doubt that the
grantor in the instant case made a taxable gift of the corpus. In Lock-
hard v. Commissioner where the issue was squarely presented, the
Court rejected the Commissioner's contention saying, "This suggested
mode of treatment may be appropriate and reasonable; the only trouble
with it is that it is not sanctioned by the statutory scheme." Why the
courts here refuse to do judicially what Congress has not done is not
clear. The concept of tax ownership and the transfer of ownership, for
the most part, has not been a legislative creation . The answer may be
that the courts will respond more readily in dealing with tax avoidance
problems than they will where the question is one of adding gratuitous-
ly to the Commissioner's sources of revenue.
RAY ECKSTEIN
Landlord-Tenant-Abandonment of Lease-Re-entry and Occupancy
by Landlord-Plaintiff leased a Northern Wisconsin cabin to the de-
fendant for a period of one year from July 15, 1947 at $37.00 per
month. Defendant paid two months rent in advance, and occupied the
premises on the agreed date. On September 15, 1947, defendant, with-
out just cause, quit the premises and thereafter ceased to pay rent.
The plaintiff, upon learning of the defendant's intention to quit the
premises, told him that she "would sue him", and two days after the
breach she brought this action, relying on the doctrine of the Wien-
sklar case.' Shortly after the abandonment, plaintiff entered and relet
the premises until October 23, 1947. Thereafter the plaintiff's husband
occupied the premises, the plaintiff joining him on weekends. The lower
court affirmed the jury award of $150.00 to the plaintiff. Held: Judg-
8115 F.(2d) 331 (C.C.A. 1st, 1940).
9 166 F.(2d) 409 (C.C.A. 1st, 1948).
1 Weinsklar Realty Co. v. Dooley et al., 200 Wis. 412 at 415, 228 N.W. 515
(1930), where the landlord relet the abandoned premises and brought an
action for breach of lease three months after the breach. The court held:
"that act [bringing the action] clearly evidenced an election on part of the
landlord to hold the tenant liable on the covenant of the lease and clearly
established the fact the landlord took possession for the purpose of reletting




ment reversed, and cause remanded with directions to dismiss the com-
plaint. Where a landlord moves in and occupies the premises for his
own benefit, he accepts the surrender. It makes little difference under
the facts whether this be treated as an acceptance of the surrender, or
a complete mitigation of damages. Richter v. Fassett, 253 Wis. 101
(1948).
In an earlier case,2 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that where
the landlord, after receiving an offer to surrender the premises, made
no answer, but upon abandonment by the tenant drew upon the leased
premises with a large quantity of dirt and filled up the leased premises
to a depth of one to two feet, the jury was allowed to find that the
landlord accepted the surrender under the theory that the landlord had
made full and beneficial use of the land. The case is distinguishable
from the principal case since the landlord did not give the tenant no-
tice, and he used the land in a manner which would have impaired the
tenant's use of the land. Also the jury found that the landlord made
full and beneficial use of the land.
As Wisconsin holds that a lease is not only a conveyance of an
estate but is also a contract,3 it is difficult to find a justifiable theory
to support the doctrine promulgated in the instant case. It is univer-
sally held that a tenant cannot terminate his lease unless the landlord
consents. 4 While the termination need not be by express agreement,
but may be made by acts of the parties which manifest an 'intent on the
part of the tenant to surrender the premises, and an intent on the part
of the landlord to accept the surrender,5 such acts must unequivocally
evidence an intent to accept the surrender.6 The intention with which
the landlord re-enters the abandoned premises is a question of fact to
be determined by the triers of fact.7 To hold that, as a matter of law,
where the landlord re-enters and occupies the premises for his own
benefit, he accepts the surrender, is to ignore the theory of intentional
acceptance. This is especially true where all of his other acts indicate
a contrary intention. Such a doctrine must presuppose that the landlord
by such occupancy, suffers no damages from the wrongful breach of
the tenant. To hold this supposition true in all cases is to ignore
reality.
2 Kneeland v. Schmidt, 78 Wis. 345, 47 N.W. 438, 11 L.R.A. 498 (1890).
3Lincoln Fireproof Warehouse Co. v. Greusel, 199 Wis. 428, 224 N.W. 98(1929).
4 Carlton Chambers Co. v. Trask, 261 Mass. 264, 158 N.E. 786 (1927), and
cases cited therein; Elmor Realty Co. v. Community Theatres, 208 Wis. 76,
241 N.W. 632 (1932).
5 Eastern Offices v. P. F. O'Keefe Advertising Agency, 289 Mass. 23, 193 N.E.
837 (1935).
6 Weinsklar Realty Co. v. Dooley et al., note 1, supra.
7 Malone Co. v. Acquistapace, 73 Cal. App. 199, 238 Pac. 734 (1925); McGrath
v. Schallett, 144 Conn. 622, 159 A. 633 (1932) ; Cassidy v. Welch, 319 Mass.
615, 67 N.E. (2d) 226 (1946).
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The North Carolina Court, when confronted by a similar situation
in the case of Monger v. Lutterloh said:
"It ought not be held that a landlord cannot, in any event
enter and relet or use the abandoned premises without effecting
a surrender of the lease as a matter of law; for in many cases
to suffer the premises to remain vacant during the unexpired
term would prove more costly and injurious to the owner than
to lose his entire rent; and if the lessor is not permitted to enter
and relet of use the property in any way without effecting a
surrender of the lease, the tenant could, through his own wrong,
force a termination by simply abandoning the premises."
The Connecticut Court in McGrath v. Schallett9 warned against the
application of this rule when it stated:
"He [landlord] should not be penalized for attempting to
mitigate damages, nor for attempting to keep his property from
deteriorating."
This is clearly true in Wisconsin where, contrary to the great weight of
authority, 0 the landlord is under a duty to mitigate damages."
The problem of determining damages sustained in this type of case
is perhaps one of the reasons the courts are so reluctant to charge the
tenant with breach. That there are damages, in spite of the reoccu-
pancy by the landlord, may be ascertained by merely asking why the
landlord leased the premises in the first instance. The Wisconsin
Court answered this question in Selts Investment Co. v. Promotors of
F. N. of W. 12 There the Court said:
"Real Estate is leased by a lessor because it yields a fund
out of which he is enabled to pay taxes, repairs, insurance, etc.,
and because it is contemplated that it will furnish a reasonable
return on investment."
The North Carolina Court applied a fair and workable rule in
Womble v. Leigh,'3 where it held that if the lessor re-enters and uses
the premises without effecting a surrender or termination of a lease,
the measure of damages is the difference between the agreed rental
and the fair rental value of the premises.
In determining the "fair rental value", consideration should be given
to the type of premises in question; whether it have a seasonal rental
value (as have the premises in the instant case), or a year around
rental value, and to what use it was put and enjoyed by the landlord
8195 N.C. 274, 142 S.E. 12 at 15 (1928).
9 McGrath v. Schallett, 144 Conn. 622, 159 A. 633 at 634 (1932).
1040 A.L.R. 190.
22 Selts Investment Co. v. Promoters of F. N. of W., 197 Wis. 471, 220 N.W.
222 (1929).
12 Ibid., p. 474.
13 195 N.C. 282, 142 S.E. 17 (1928).
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after the breach. These considerations assume added importance in
this jurisdiction because of the great number of lakeside vacation
cottages, which, normally, have a rental value during the vacation sea-
son, and are virtually unrentable for the rest of the year, but are likely
subjects for longer leases due to the present housing shortage.
Such considerations would help prevent the inequitable result of
the instant case where the tenant occupied premises which had a rental
value of $45-00 per week during the nine weeks of his occupancy, for
which he had promised to pay $37.00 per month for a year, but actually
paying only a total of $74.00. The landlord occupied the premises dur-
ing the period when the property was unrentable.' 4
WILLIAm A. RITCHAY
Torts-Human Intervening Force as Breaking the Chain of Causation
- Plaintiff was driving an automobile on highway 12 in Minnesota
and defendant Butler was riding with him as a passenger in the front
seat. Defendant Knudsen in his car was directly behind plaintiff on
the highway. Knudsen attempted to pass plaintiff and turned into the
left lane, coming up approximately abreast of the plaintiff's car. A
cattle truck was approaching from the other direction and the highway,
having only two lanes, could not accommodate all three vehicles. In
this perilous position, plaintiff, in order to save himself, turned to the
right in order to get on the shoulder of the road. Defendant Butler,
the passenger, grabbed the wheel and turned the automobile to the left
causing it to go across the highway and into a ditch on the left side of
the road where it rolled over. Plaintiff's automobile touched neither the
truck nor Knudsen's car. Defendant Knudsen contended that the act
of defendant Butler was an efficient intervening force relieving Knud-
sen of any liability. Plaintiff's contention was that the negligence of
Knudsen set in motion a series of events which culminated in the acci-
dent and that the negligence of both defendants proximately contributed
to the damages which he sustained. Held: That the act of defendant
Butler in grabbing the steering wheel and forcing plaintiff's car to the
left across the highway and into the ditch, when defendant Knudsen
was attempting to pass plaintiff's automobile in the face of an oncoming
truck, was an "efficient intervening cause" of the accident, so as to re-
lieve defendant Knudsen from liability for plaintiff's injuries. Robin-
son v. Butler et al., 33 N.W. (2d) 821 (Minnesota, 1948.)
The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated in earlier cases' that in
determining whether an alleged intervening cause is sufficient to re-
lieve the original actor of responsibility the test is this:
'1 See principal case, p. 104.
2 Childs v. Standard Oil Co., 149 Minn. 166 at 170, 182 N.W. 1000 at 1001 (1921).
19481
